Journal of Accountancy
Volume 33

Issue 1

Article 5

1-1922

Income-tax Department
Stephen G. Rusk

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Rusk, Stephen G. (1922) "Income-tax Department," Journal of Accountancy: Vol. 33: Iss. 1, Article 5.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jofa/vol33/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Accountancy by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information,
please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk
In the December issue of The Journal of Accountancy attention was
directed to a recommendation of the committee on appeals and review
relative to the conditions that govern in cases of those taxpayers who are
“officers or employees of a state or a political subdivision.” This recom
mendation contains a concise and clear definition and is important to those
who are likely to come in contact with taxpayers who have this problem
to solve. Through inadvertence the recommendation was not printed in
the December issue but it will be found in the present number.
Taxpayers whose 1917 returns were based upon invested capital that
included any inflation or appreciation of value are given until January 15,
1922, to make amended returns and pay the additional tax. This additional
time is the subject matter of treasury decision No. 3243, which amends
treasury decision No. 3220. The latter decision, dated August 26, 1921, had
set the limit for filing these amended returns and for payment of the
additional tax at November 24, 1921.
Another decision which will be found well worth reading is No. 3252
which comprehends a decision by Judge Hand of the United States district
court, southern district of New York, in the case of Henry R. Towne versus
Richard J. McElligott. The outstanding feature of this decision that will
appeal to accountants is the manner in which the court decides that profit
should be computed upon the sale of stock that had come into possession
of the taxpayer by purchase prior to March 1, 1913, by purchase subsequent
thereto and by stock dividend. The court apportions the profit among these
three classes in an ingenious and logical manner, not in accordance, how
ever, with usual accounting methods. Another feature of interest in this
decision is that the court does not view a tax of 72% of the profit on this
transaction as confiscatory. It would seem that few taxpayers would
dispose of property if they were to receive only 28% of the profit accruing
from such sale. Of course, the court’s decision may have been somewhat
influenced by the fact that when the tax on this transaction was merged
with the tax upon the particular individual’s other income, the whole repre
sented a tax of only 50% of the combined income.

TREASURY RULINGS
Section 213(b), Article 85: Compensation of
A. R. R. 664
state officers.
(Sol. Op. 122)
Recommended, in the appeal of A, that the. action of the
income-tax unit in holding that certain income received for
services rendered by him to a state and political subdivision
thereof constitutes taxable income under the revenue act of
1918, be sustained, and accordingly, that the taxpayer’s appeal
be denied.
The committee has had under consideration the appeal of A, from the
action of the income-tax unit in holding that certain items of income'
received in 1918 for services rendered constituted taxable income and not
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such income as is exempted by section 213(b), revenue act of 1918 and
article 85 of regulations 45.
The question involved being one for legal determination in the light of
the attendant facts, the case was submitted to the solicitor, whose opinion
is fully set forth in solicitor’s opinion 122, dated September 12, which is
here quoted.
SOLICITOR’S OPINION 122.
INCOME TAX—SECTION 213, REVENUE ACT APPROVED FEBRUARY 24, 1919.

Exemption—Compensation of Officers and Employees of a State or a
Political Subdivision Thereof.
Compensation received for services rendered to a state or a
political subdivision thereof is included in gross income unless
the person receives such compensation as on officer or employee
of a state or political subdivision.
An officer is a person who occupies a position in the service
of the government, the tenure of which is continuous and not
temporary and the duties of which are established by law or
regulations and not by agreement.
An employee is one whose duties consist in the rendition of
prescribed services and not the accomplishment of specific
objects, and whose services are continuous, not occasional or
temporary.
The question is presented as to whether the compensation received by A
for services rendered the state of Y and political subdivisions thereof is
exempt from the income tax.
The facts presented are as follows: The taxpayer was in the employ
of a commission to consolidate the laws of the state of Y as an expert
advisor on certain laws under an arrangement by which he gave his entire
time when called upon for a definite sum per hour for the time actually
expended. He filed a statement monthly and the amount due him was paid
by the state treasurer from an appropriation marked “salary.” The com
pensation received from this source amounted to x dollars.
The taxpayer also served as commissioner on the Z grade crossings. He
was appointed by the court for determining the advisability and method of
abolishing certain grade-crossings. He was appointed in accordance with
the laws of the state of Y, which authorizes a court on the filing of a
petition by the attorney general to appoint three disinterested persons as
commissioners for the purposes above stated. They are required by
statute to make their report to the court, which, if confirmed, becomes final.
Such commissioners are appointed to act only in a particular case.
The taxpayer also rendered legal services to the town of R and the
city of S on particular occasions and in particular matters. It is also
stated by the taxpayer that he has been counsel for the county of T for
several years, but is not paid a salary, receiving compensation on the basis
of services actually rendered. No facts are presented with reference to
this item of compensation upon which an opinion can be based as to
whether the taxpayer was an officer or employee of such county. Con
sequently, no opinion is herein expressed in regard to the compensation
which the taxpayer received from the county of T for such services.
It is not sufficient, in the opinion of this office, to show that a person
rendered service to and received compensation from a state or political
subdivision thereof to entitle such compensation to exemption from income
tax. It must be shown that in rendering such service he was an officer
or employee thereof. The compensation of officers and employees of a
state or political subdivision thereof was specifically exempted in the
revenue acts of 1913, 1916 and 1917. The exemption as to such compen
sation in those acts was plainly an interpretation by congress of the
decisions of the United States supreme court as to the taxability of federal
agencies by states and of the taxability of state agencies by the federal
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government, and was merely expressive of what Congress considered it
had no right to tax by virtue of such supreme court decisions. (McCullock
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Dobbins v. Commissioners, 16 Pet. 436; Col
lector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113).
The revenue act of 1918, although containing no provisions as to
exemption of such compensation, has been interpreted by the attorney
general to exempt the same compensation as was specifically exempted by
the former acts, for the reason that congress had no power to tax the
same (31 Op. Atty. Gen. 441). The revenue act of 1918 has been similarly
interpreted by the treasury department to apply only to the compensation
received by officers and employees of a state or political subdivision thereof
(art. 85, Reg. 45, 1920 ed.), and it is specifically provided in article 37,
Regulations 45, that any profit received from a state or political subdivision
thereof by an independent contractor is taxable income. In the above cited
cases of McCullock v. Maryland; Dobbins v. Commissioners, and Collector
v. Day, the United States supreme court held that the federal government
had no power to tax the instrumentalities of states in the execution of
their governmental functions and that the states had no power to tax
such instrumentalities of the federal government. The court in the case of
Battman v. Warwick (102 Fed. 127) said that the exemption of compen
sation of officers and employees of states or political subdivisions thereof
contained in the revenue act of 1898 was “undoubtedly inserted in order
to conform to these decisions.”
In order, therefore, that the compensation received by A may be entitled
to exemption from the income tax, it must be shown that he was an
officer or employee of the state of Y or of a political subdivision thereof.
Numerous cases have been considered by the courts in which the
question involved was whether a person was an officer or an employee of
the government or of another person. There is one thought which runs
through all the decisions on the question, and that is that in order to be
an officer or employee it must appear that the duties performed by such
person are of a continuous nature and are not occasional, temporary, or
specific in character or object.
In rendering the services to the commission for the consolidation of
laws for the state of Y, acting as commissioner for the Z grade crossings,
the services rendered the town of R and the city of S, it is not claimed
by the taxpayer that he was vested with offices, the tenure and duties of
which were established by law, and such was plainly not the case. With
reference to the services rendered to the commission for the consolidation
of laws, it is stated that he was employed by the commission
to give his entire services when called upon for a stated sum per hour,
but he was not required to respond to the call of the commission, and he
was not under its direction, except in the specific instances when he desired
to serve it.
Nor were the services rendered as commissioner on the Z grade-crossings
matter performed in the capacity of an officer. The term “officer” is in
separably connected with an office. There can be no officer without an office.
There was no office of commissioner which had been created and was
existing. The position was brought into being only for a special and
particular case. It was a single and isolated duty and not an office having
any tenure. No oath was required to be taken as such commissioner. The
place remains in existence only during the pendency of each particular
case. The duties are not regular and continuous. Such a commissioner
has no general duties to perform which extend over any case other than
as he is selected to act in that particular case.
With reference to the services rendered to the town of R and the city
of S, it is not shown that the taxpayer occupied any office while rendering
such services. His services were in isolated transactions and each occasion
when he rendered services was a separate and closed transaction. The
services were limited in duration and specific in their objects.
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It was stated by the United States supreme court in the twenty-per-cent.
cases (20 Wall. 179) :
A government office is different from a government contract. The
latter from its nature is necessarily limited in its duration and specific
in its objects.
Employment under a contract to do an act or perform a service does
not constitute one an officer. This was specifically held in United States v.
Maurice, Fed. Cases, No. 15747, wherein the court said:
An office is defined to be a “public charge or employment” and he who
performs the duties of the office is an officer. If employed on the part of
the United States he is an officer of the United States. Although an office
is “an employment,” it does not follow that every employment is an office.
A man may certainly be employed under a contract, express or implied,
to do an act or perform a service without becoming an officer. But if a
duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the gov
ernment, and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by govern
ment to perform, who enters on the duties appertaining to his station
without any contract defining them, if those duties continue, though the
person be changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or
employment from an office, or the person who performs the duties from
an officer.
And in United States v. Hartwell (6 Wall., 385, 393), in which the
supreme court held that:
.
.
.
The employment of the defendant was in the public service of the
United States. He was appointed pursuant to law and his compensation
was fixed by law. Vacating the office of his superior would not have
affected the tenure of his place. His duties were continuing and perma
nent, not occasional or temporary. They were to be such as his superior
in office should prescribe.
In the case of Auffmordt v. Heddon (137 U. S., 310) the court had
before it for consideration whether a “merchant appraiser” appointed by
the collector of customs under the authority of revised statutes 2930, and
whose compensation, though fixed by statute, was payable by the importer,
was an officer of the United States, and the court said:
He is selected for the special case. He has no general functions, nor
any employment which has any duration as to time or which extends over
any case further than as he is selected to act in that particular case * * *
he has no claim or right to be designated.
In the case of United States v. Germaine, the United States supreme
court said:
If we look to the nature of defendant’s employment, we think it equally
clear that he is not an officer. In that case the court said the term embraces
the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument and duties, and that the latter
were continuing and permanent, not occasional or temporary. In the case
now before us, the duties are not continuing and permanent, and they are
occasional and intermittent. The surgeon is only to act when called on
by the commissioner of pensions in some special case, as when some pen
sioner or claimant of a pension presents himself for examination. He
may make fifty of these examinations in a year, or none. He is
required to keep no place of business for the public use. He gives no
bond and takes no oath, unless by some order of the commissioner of
pensions of which we are not advised.
No regular appropriation is made to pay his compensation, which is
$2 for every certificate of examination, but it is paid out of money appro
priated for paying pensions in his district, under regulations to be pre
scribed by the commissioner. He is but an agent of the commissioner,
appointed by him, and removable by him at his pleasure, to procure infor
mation needed to aid in the performance of his own official duties. He
may appoint one or a dozen persons to do the same thing. The compen
sation may amount to $5 or $500 per annum. There is no penalty for his
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absence from duty or refusal to perform, except his loss of the fee in
the given case. If congress had passed a law requiring the commissioner
to appoint a man to furnish each agency with fuel at a price per ton fixed
by law high enough to secure the delivery of the coal, he would have as
much claim to be an officer of the United States as the surgeons appointed
under this statute.
With reference to the above decision, the United States supreme court
in the case of United States v. Mouat (124 U. S., 303), said:
What is necessary to constitute a person an officer of the United States
in any of the various branches of its service has been very fully con
sidered by this court in United States v. Germaine (99 U. S., 508) * * *.
We do not see any reason to review this well-established decision of what
it is that constitutes an officer.
Applying the principles of law above enunciated to the facts in this
case, it is clear that the taxpayer in rendering services to the state of Y
and political subdivisions thereof was not an officer of the state or political
subdivisions. As was said by the United States supreme court in the
case of Auffmordt v. Heddon, supra, he was selected for the special case.
He had no general functions or any employment which had any duration
as to time or which extended over any case other than as he was selected
to act in that particular case. He occupied no position in the service of
the state or political subdivision, the tenure and duties of which were
established by law or regulations. He was not required to take an oath
which is required of all officers of that state, nor was he commissioned.
In the rendition of the services in the capacities set forth, the taxpayer
did not exercise any function of government either legislative, executive,
or judicial. No part of the state sovereignty was delegated to him.
In view of the foregoing, this office is of the opinion that A in
rendering services to the commission for the consolidation of laws, as
commissioner in the Z grade crossings matter, to the town of R or the
city of S was not an officer of the state of Y or of any political sub
division thereof. The question is then presented as to whether the tax
payer was an employee of such state or political subdivision.
In order to be an employee of the state or a political subdivision
thereof, it must appear that the relation, to some extent at least, of master
and servant existed between the employer and the employee. In the case of
Vane v. Newcombe (132 U. S. 133), the United States supreme court set
forth a fundamental distinction between the relation of employer and
employee and that of a contractor. In that case the court said:
* * * It seems to us that Vane was a contractor with the company
and not an employee. We think the distinction pointed out by the court
is a sound one, namely, that to be an employee within the meaning of the
statute Vane must have been a servant bound in some degree at least
to the duty of a servant and not as if he were a mere contractor bound
only to produce or cause to be produced a certain result, a result of labor
to be sure, but free to dispose of his own time and personal efforts
according to his pleasure without responsibility to the other party.
Employment of a person in a particular transaction to accomplish a
specific result, who, while in the execution thereof is not under the direction
of the employer is not an employee. An employee is one engaged in the
rendition of services and not in the accomplishment of specific results. It
is essential that there be some continuity to the employment and that the
duties be not occasional or temporary and not specific in character or
object as a result of contractual relations.
In Lewis v. Fisher (26 L. R. A. 278), the Maryland court of appeals
held as follows:
The terms "officers” and "employees” both alike, refer to those in
regular and continual service. Within the ordinary acceptation of the
terms, one who is engaged to render service in a particular transaction
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is neither an officer nor an employee. They imply continuity of service,
and exclude those employed for a special and single transaction.
The question whether an attorney serving a railway was an employee
was presented to the supreme court in Louisville, etc., Railway v. Wilson
(138 U. S. 501, 505), and decided as follows:
The terms “officers” and “employees” both alike, refer to those in regular
and continual service. Within the ordinary acceptation of the terms, one
who is engaged to render service in a particular transaction is neither
an officer nor an employee. They imply continuity of service, and exclude
those employed for a special and single transaction. An attorney of an
individual, retained for a single suit, is not his employee. It is true he
was engaged to render services; but his engagement is rather that of a
contractor than that of an employee.
It is stated by the taxpayer that he has been in the regular and con
tinuous employ of the commission for the consolidation of laws for the
past four years. It does not appear, however, that he was under any obli
gation to render any service to the commission except on the particular
occasions when it suited his convenience to do so. It would appear that
he would only fail to receive his compensation if he failed to render the
services when called upon. If it be established as a fact that he was
called upon so frequently as to remain in the continuous employ of the
commission, this would not constitute such employment a continuous em
ployment, since it appears that each time he was called upon represented
a separate transaction. He was not under obligations by virtue of his
engagement to do anything, and on such occasions as he was called upon
he rendered services to the commission because of his desire to do so on
the particular occasions. The statement, therefore, that the taxpayer was in
the regular and continuous employ of the commission becomes immaterial
in view of the fact that he was kept in such continuous employ by virtue
of separate undertakings.
It appears to this office from the facts stated that the taxpayer was
but an agent of the commission to consolidate laws and was not an arm
of the state for the exercise of a governmental function. He furnished
information to the commission at their request. The relationship of master
and servant or that of employer and employee did not exist. The com
mission had no control over the taxpayer in any manner whatsoever in the
performance of what he was called upon to do. Whenever they desired
his services they called upon him for the same. They were in no position
to require his presence or to require him to furnish them any information.
While it appears that the taxpayer rendered services to the commission
at such times as they called upon him, at a stipulated price per hour, it is
not shown that this compensation was not subject to change for each
occasion when he was called upon or that he owed any obligation to the
commission to furnish any information in any matter unless on the partic
ular occasion he desired to do so. Each occasion, therefore, is a specific
undertaking. He was an independent agent. He was called upon on
occasions to furnish the commission with information desired by them
in performing their public duties. He could not be considered an employee
of the state any more than a person who furnished coal to a public
building at an agreed price per ton or a manufacturer or merchant who
furnished supplies to public institutions.
With reference to the services rendered as commissioner for the Z grade
crossings, it is equally clear that the taxpayer was not an employee. It
could not be said in any sense that the relationship of master and servant
existed between the taxpayer and the state of Y or a political subdivision
thereof. He was appointed to act as one of three commissioners whose
duties, as prescribed by statute, required them, after a hearing of the
interested parties, to make a report to the court. No one had the power
to direct the manner of the performance of their duties or to control their
action. The court could confirm or reject their report, but had no power
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to direct them in the performance of their duty in such a manner as
would constitute them employees within the definition of that term by the
United States supreme court in the case of Vane v. Newcombe, supra, nor
were the services rendered of a continuous nature. On the other hand
they were specific and limited in character, and were in a particular
transaction.
Nor in rendering services to the town of R or the city of S was the
taxpayer an employee thereof. He was not in the regular and continuous
service of such town or city, nor did the relationship of master and servant
in any degree exist. In rendering such services he was an independent
agent, and rendered specific services for an agreed consideration.
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the compensation received by A
for services rendered to the state of Y and political subdivisions thereof
as set forth herein is not exempt from the income tax.
In view of the foregoing opinion in which the committee concurs,
it is recommended in the appeal of A that the action of the income-tax
unit in holding that certain income received for services rendered by him
to a state and political subdivision thereof constitutes taxable income
under the revenue act of 1918 be sustained, and accordingly that the tax
payer’s appeal be denied.
(T. D. 3242—November 9, 1921)
Income tax—Public health service—Military and naval forces of the
United States—Opinion of Attorney General.
The personnel of the Public Health Service is not a part of the military
forces of the United States within the meaning of the term “military and
naval forces of the United States” contained in section 1 of the revenue act
of 1918. The members thereof are not entitled to the exemption granted
to such forces in section 213 (b) (8) of such act.
There is given * * * an opinion rendered by the attorney general,
under date of October 29, 1921, dealing with the right of the personnel of
the public health service to the exemption granted to the members of the
military and naval forces of the United States in section 213 (b) (8) of
the revenue act of 1918.
(T. D. 3243—November 14, 1921)
Income tax.
Extension of time for filing amended returns required by T. D. 3220,
approved August 26, 1921, in cases in which appreciated or inflated values
have been used in determining invested capital.
Under the provisions of T. D. 3220, approved August 26, 1921, all tax
payers who, in the preparation of their income and profits tax returns for
1917 and subsequent years, have used appreciated or inflated values in deter
mining the amount of their invested capital are required to file amended
returns within 90 days from the date of that decision and make payment
of the additional tax shown to be due.
In view of the fact that many taxpayers are unable to complete their
returns by November 24, 1921, the last date under which amended returns
may be filed, as provided by T. D. 3220, an extension of time up to and
including January 15, 1922, is hereby granted within which to file such
amended returns and make payment of the additional tax due.
(T. D. 3245—November 14, 1921)
War profits and excess-profits taxes—Limitation.
Articles 732 and 733, Regulations No. 45 (1920 edition), amended.
Articles 732 and 733, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition), are hereby
amended to read as follows:
Art. 732. Limitation when return for fractional part of year.—When a
return is rendered for a fractional part of a year, the limitation shall be
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computed in the same manner as if the period covered by the return were
a full taxable year.
Art. 733. Illustration of computation of limitation of tax.—If in the
illustration used in article 720 the invested capital had been $100,000 and the
net income $60,000, the tax computed under section 301 (a) of the statute
would be $56,200. Section 302 provides, however, that the tax under sec
tion 301 (a) shall not be more than 30 per cent. of the net income in excess
of $3,000 and not in excess of $20,000 plus 80 per cent, of the net income in
excess of $20,000. The tax at the 30 per cent. rate will be $5,100 (art. 731)
and the balance of the tax will be 80 per cent. of $60,000 (the net income
in excess of $20,000), or $48,000. The total tax will therefore be $5,100
plus $48,000, or $53,100. The tax under section 301 (a), amounting to
$56,200, will accordingly be reduced to $53,100.
(T. D. 3247—November 7, 1921)
.
Income tax—Gross income—Inclusions
Article 52 of Regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) amended.
Article 52 of regulations No. 45 (1920 edition) is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Art. 52. When included in gross income.—Gains, profits and income are
to be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which they are
received by the taxpayer, unless they are included when they accrue to
him in accordance with the approved method of accounting followed by
him. See articles 21-24. Lands which are received as compensation for
services in one year, the title to which is disputed and in a later year
adjudged to be valid, constitute income to the grantee in the former year.
On the other hand, a person may sue in one year on a pecuniary claim
or for property, but money or property recovered on a judgment therefor
rendered in a later year would be income in that year, assuming that it
would have been income in the earlier year if then received. This is true
of a recovery for patent infringement. Bad debts or accounts charged off
subsequent to February 28, 1913, because of the fact that they are deter
mined to be worthless, which are subsequently recovered, whether or not by
suit, constitute income for the year in which recovered. For the rule to
be followed in the case of bad debts charged off as worthless prior to
March 1, 1913, and recovered subsequent to that date, see article 87 as
amended by T. D. 3206, approved July 28, 1921. See also articles 111 and 151.
In view of the unusual conditions prevailing at the close of the year 1918
it is recognized that many items of gross income, such as claims for com
pensation under canceled contracts, together with claims against contracting
departments of the government for amortization and other matters, while
properly constituting gross income for the taxable year 1918, were undecided
and not sufficiently definite in amount to be reported in the original return
for that year. In every such case the taxpayer should attach to his return
a full statement of such pending claims and other matters, and when the
correct amount of such items is ascertained an amended return for the
taxable year 1918 should be filed.
(T. D. 3251—November 25, 1921)
Abatement of assessments as erroneous or illegal.
The validity of an assessment depends upon the law and actual facts
existing. Therefore, an assessment made upon an erroneous theory or by
mistake may not be remitted or abated because so made, if, at the time
its validity is passed upon, the commissioner is in possession of evidence
which shows an equivalent amount of tax is properly due in connection with
the income, transaction, or matter upon which the assessment is predicated.
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(T. D. 3252—November 25, 1921)
Income taxes—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Surtax of 72 per cent.—Confiscation within Meaning of Fifth
Amendment to Constitution.
A graduated income tax which applies at a rate of 72 per cent. on a
portion of a taxpayer’s net income and at an average rate of 50 per cent.
on his entire net income is not confiscatory within the meaning of the fifth
amendment of the constitution.
2. Profit on Sale of Stock, which Includes in Part Stock Received as
Stock Dividend.
Where a taxpayer received a 50 per cent. stock dividend upon shares
of stock, part of which were purchased prior to March 1, 1913, and part
subsequent thereto, and in 1918 sold the original certificates held on March
1, 1913, part of the stock purchased after March 1, 1913, and part of the
stock received as the 50 per cent. stock dividend, the basis for computing
the profit from such sale shall be as follows: For each certificate held on
March 1, 1913, two-thirds of its value on that date; for each certificate
acquired thereafter, two-thirds of its purchase price; and upon each cer
tificate for stock dividend shares if identified as issued against a specified
earlier certificate, one-third of the value on March 1, 1913, of the stock upon
which the dividend was declared or one-third of the purchase price of the
stock upon which the dividend was declared, as the case may be. If the
stock received as a dividend can not be identified as having been declared
upon any specific lot of the old stock, the sales of the dividend stock should
be applied against the dividend stock chargeable to the first purchase remain
ing unsold when the stock dividend was declared. (See T. D. 3238.)
The appended decision of the United States district court for the southern
district of New York, in the case of Towne v. McElligott, acting collector,
is published for the information of internal revenue officers and others
concerned.

United States District Court, Southern District of New York
Henry R. Towne v. Richard J. McElligott, acting collector of United States
internal revenue for the third district of the State of New York.
[August 5, 1921]
This case arises upon demurrer to a complaint by a taxpayer for money
paid on income taxes. It raises two questions: First, whether the profits
realized upon the sale of the plaintiff’s shares of stock were correctly com
puted; second, whether a surtax of 72 per cent. on such profits was confis
catory. The first question depends upon these facts: The plaintiff owned
shares in a corporation before March 1, 1913, and bought other shares
thereafter. Later he received a stock dividend of 50 per cent. upon all
his shares. In 1918 he sold some of his shares, including those certificates
which he had held on March 1, 1913, those which he had bought later,
and some of those which he had received as a stock dividend. The tax was
collected on the following basis: The plaintiff was charged with the gross
sale price and credited on each share sold with the average cost of all the
shares. This average for each share was computed by dividing the gross
cost of all such shares by the number of the shares including the shares
declared as a stock dividend. The plaintiff argues that he should be credited
with the actual cost of each certificate, computing the cost of the shares
declared as a stock dividend at nothing. Thus the difference between the
parties is whether in estimating the taxpayer’s credit on each share sold,
the stock dividend shares should be brought into hotchpot with the shares
on which the stock dividend was declared.
Learned Hand, district judge: I shall take up the second point first,
since if it were sound it would dispose of the whole case. In brief it comes
to this, that a tax of 72 per cent. on the last increment of the plaintiff’s
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income, and a tax of 50 per cent. upon his whole income, is confiscatory,
and if so, void under the fifth amendment. The term “confiscatory,'* when
so used, is clearly one of degree because literally all taxes are pro tanto
confiscatory. Except as it imports some inequality of burden, not here
suggested, it can mean nothing but that there is a measure to the amount
which the government may seize in taxes for its own purposes. The plaintiff
relies on certain language in Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry. (240 U. S., 1,24,25)
which, broken from its context, he thinks helps his contention. The meaning
of that language is only that there may be inequalities in the rates of levy
great enough to become a confiscation of the income which suffered the
highest rates. The chief justice identified possible confiscation with a tax
“so wanting in bases for classification as to produce such a gross and patent
inequality as to inevitably lead to the same conclusion,” i. e., the conclusion
that the property was confiscated. I do not read this language as giving
any color for arguing that when the inequalities are lawful the rates may
be confiscatory as a whole, nor is there any such suggestion in the books
that I have seen.
In fact our war taxes are not out of relation to the sums levied by other
civilized nations faced with the same exigencies as the great war imposed
upon us. In critical periods of a nation’s life the power to tax may be
necessary to preserve it, and perhaps there is no limit beyond which it may
not subject the property within its reach to contributions. I need not go
so far as that in this case; it is enough that the powers of congress are.
to be interpreted, not by dialectical ingenuity but by the current practices
of nations in the exercise of similar powers. It is true that these powers
are limited and that those limits must be observed, however little they
circumscribe the analogous powers of other legislatures. Yet when the
question is of the interpretation of those broad counsels of moderation con
tained in the fifth amendment, we must interpret the limitations themselves
with an eye to the practices which have become tolerated elsewhere among
civilized nations. Were it not so, we should be limited forever to the political
usages of 1789, and those amendments which were intended to protect the
individual against extravagant or invidious discrimination would become
a strait-jacket upon the nation’s freedom.
The second point is raised by Eisner v. Macomber (252 U. S., 189) and
must be ruled by its implications. Under the doctrine of that case a stock
dividend is not regarded as new property at all. The old certificate repre
sented precisely the same property as the old and new do thereafter. The
old shares have proliferated, as it were, and although the right they repre
sented has now suffered a cellular division into smaller units of greater
number, that is all that has happened. In view of this it seems to me
difficult to avoid regarding the old and new shares together as anything
more than the evidence of a right which has persisted unchanged through
the declaration of the dividend. It might have been possible to look at the
new shares as declared from the surplus and the surplus as not included
in the old shares (at least not in the same sense as the new shares comprise
it), but all such notions were expressly repudiated in the prevailing opinion.
If so, each of the new shares, whether contained in the old or the new
certificates, represents a part of the original property purchased, and in
selling the first certificate the stockholder has not sold the whole of what
he originally bought and should not be credited with the whole purchase
price. Judge Rose, in Safe Deposit, etc., Co. v. Miles (273 Fed., 822),
has adopted the same theory of computing an income tax in a stronger case.
There the plaintiff sold some “rights” declared upon his stock, and Judge
Rose computed his profit in substantially the same way as I suggest here.
The plaintiff answers this argument by saying that if so all shares at
any time held by a stockholder must be brought into hotchpot and averaged.
I scarcely think that consistency requires me to go so far. The law may
and in fact does recognize an identity in every share which can indeed
be traced upon the books of the company, at least until certificates are
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consolidated, and later subdivided. The purchase of a number of shares can
be earmarked by the certificate and it is an enormous convenience to keep
the purchase separate. Yet it is possible and consistent when new shares
are declared to attribute them ratably in subdivision of those already issued.
They are not so entered on the books, it is true, but the books are not kept
in accordance with the underlying doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber, supra,
in any event. At least the earlier certificates need not lose their separate
identity because new shares are filiated to them in proper proportion.
An illustration will make clear what I mean. Suppose a man has
certificate A for 100 shares bought at $100, certificate B for 100 bought
at $150, and certificate C for 100 bought for $200. Suppose further that a
stock dividend of 50 per cent. is declared and he gets one certificate D for
150 shares without paying anything. If he sells certificate A, he would
be deemed to sell not the whole of his first purchase but only two-thirds
of it and he could credit himself with only $6,666. If he sold certificate B,
he would credit himself with $10,000, and if certificate C, with $13,333.
If he sold certificate D, he could credit himself with $15,000, made up of
$3,333 from his first purchase, $5,000 from his second, and $6,666 from
his third. If, on the other hand, he sold only a part of certificate D, some
arbitrary rule of apportionment must be adopted allocating the shares sold
among his purchases. The most natural analogy is with payment upon an
open account where the law has always allocated the earlier payments to
the earlier debts in the absence of a contrary intention. Accordingly, if
all the new shares were not sold at once, I think the first sales should be
attributed to the first purchases still remaining unsold when the stock
dividend was declared. I do not see that this method will result in con
fusion in its application, and it carries into effect the underlying theory of
Eisner v. Macomber, supra.
The tax at bar was not computed quite in this way because all the
purchases before the declaration of the stock dividend were brought into
hotchpot. This I think was inconsistent with the theory of the identity of
the shares involved in each purchase. It must, therefore, be recalculated,
which the parties have kindly consented to do if they are told the rule.
The credits will be computed as follows: Upon each certificate held on
March 1,1913, two-thirds its value on that day, i. e., $230; upon each certificate
bought at $100, $66⅔; upon each certificate for stock dividend shares if
issued against any specified earlier certificate the same credit per share as
the shares of that certificate. If the certificate of new shares is not so
earmarked, or if but one certificate was issued for the new shares, then
credit will be allowed of two-thirds the value of the shares on March 1,
1913, until half the number of shares have been sold which the plaintiff
held on March 1, 1913, and retained the stock dividend.
The formal disposition of the demurrer will depend upon this calculation.
If the tax is less than that collected, the demurrer will be overruled and
the plaintiff will take judgment for the difference; if it is greater or the
same, the demurrer will be sustained and the complaint dismissed with costs.
Idaho Association of Certified Public Accountants
At the annual meeting of the Idaho Association of Certified Public
Accountants held December 3rd and 4th, the following officers were elected:
Norman H. Young, president; Charles E. Folsom, vice-president; J. W.
Robinson, secretary-treasurer; directors, Clarence Van Deusen, James
Munro, Edwin A. Wilson and John Ewald.
Reports for the past year were read and minor amendments to the
by-laws were made. A resolution was adopted, to be forwarded to the
Idaho senators and representatives, asking their favorable consideration of
senate bill No. 2531, the purpose of which is to establish a board of exam
iners for the District of Columbia.
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